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Note
Challenging the Plausibility Standard Under the
Rules Enabling Act
Edwin W. Stockmeyer∗
In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Aschroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that in order to survive a motion to dismiss
1
for failure to state a claim, a complaint must be plausible. To
satisfy this plausibility standard, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to permit a reasonable inference that the defendant
2
is liable for the alleged misconduct. In dissent, Justice John
Paul Stevens suggested that this standard would disrupt the
long-standing uniformity between federal and state pleading
3
standards. Indeed, since Twombly, a number of state courts
have explicitly rejected or declined to apply the plausibility
4
standard. As a result, there is an increasing number of conflicts between the pleading standards in state and federal
5
courts. This disuniformity will become the object of dispute as
∗ J.D. candidate, 2013 University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
the Staff and Board of the Minnesota Law Review for making Volume 97 a
success. Thank you also to my parents for their constant optimism and support. Most of all, thank you to Holly for your unyielding love; I owe you everything. Copyright © 2013 by Edwin W. Stockmeyer.
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
2. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
3. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Taking their
cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of Columbia utilize as
their standard for dismissal of a complaint the very language the majority repudiates: whether it appears ‘beyond doubt’ that ‘no set of facts’ in support of
the claim would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”).
4. See, e.g., Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346
S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tenn. 2011) (“We decline to adopt the new plausibility
standard and adhere . . . to the notice pleading standard . . . .”); McCurry v.
Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864 (Wash. 2010) (holding that there
is “no similar basis to fundamentally alter our interpretation of CR 12(b)(6)
that has been in effect for nearly 50 years and decline to do so here” (citations
omitted)).
5. See Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great
Split Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
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federal district courts, hearing actions based solely on diversity
6
of citizenship jurisdiction, decide whether to apply state or
federal pleading standards.
When faced with conflicting state and federal law in diversity cases, federal courts determine the applicable law according to the Erie doctrine which, speaking generally, instructs
federal courts to apply state “substantive” law but federal rules
7
of “procedure.” However, in the Supreme Court’s most recent
Erie doctrine decision, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
Allstate Insurance Co., the Court issued a fractured opinion
with a majority of Justices agreeing in the result, but only a
minority of Justices agreeing on how to interpret the Rules Enabling Act (REA)—the statute governing the validity of proce8
dural and evidentiary rules in federal courts. While Justice
Antonin Scalia leaves almost no room for state law to apply
9
when there is a controlling federal rule, Justice Stevens would
give some deference, albeit limited, to state specific policies en10
gendered in procedural rules. Shady Grove’s diverging opinions left unclear the status of federal rules that directly conflict
11
with their state counterparts. As a result, district courts lack
109, 109 (“Other states will have to decide the same issue in the months and
years to come.”).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
7. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state”); id. at 92
(Reed, J., concurring) (assuring that “[t]he line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure”).
8. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431 (2010). Although Shady Grove resulted in a five-to-four majority decision,
five of the nine Justices explicitly disagreed with plurality opinion’s analysis.
See id. at 1448–60 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1460–73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (arguing that “Congress has undoubted
power to supplant state law, and undoubted power to prescribe rules for the
courts it has created, so long as those rules regulate matters ‘rationally capable of classification’ as procedure” (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472
(1965))).
10. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that a federal rule “cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that
is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but so intertwined with a state
right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created
right”).
11. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the
Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25 (2010) (“When
the dust settled at the end of the [Shady Grove] opinions, little was resolved.
The proper interpretive approach to the [Rules] Enabling Act remains an open
question.”).
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clear guidelines to follow when choosing between such conflicting rules.
This Note argues that application of the plausibility stand12
ard violates the terms of the REA when it conflicts with a
more lenient state pleading rule. This Note does not argue for
or against plausibility or notice pleading generally but simply
takes vertically disuniform pleading standards as given and
analyzes that conflict of law within the context of the REA.
Part I first introduces relevant state and federal pleading
standards and then proceeds to analyze and highlight their differences. Part II introduces the Court’s Erie doctrine jurisprudence and the diverging approaches to interpreting the REA
exhibited in Shady Grove, arguing that Justice Stevens’s interpretation is more accurate than Justice Scalia’s. Part III
demonstrates that the REA does not “enable” the plausibility
standard to displace state pleading rules that are sufficiently
substantive, examines the advantages of this approach, and responds to potential criticisms. When a state pleading standard
is more lenient than its federal counterpart, it may operate to
define the scope of the state’s substantive rights and therefore
should apply in federal courts.
I. PLEADING RULES: DISUNIFORM STANDARDS AND
POLICIES
A review of both state and federal pleading standards is
necessary to understand how courts should analyze the validity
of the plausibility standard in diversity cases. This Part proceeds in two sections. First, it describes the Court’s development of the plausibility standard. Next, it examines how state
courts have responded to the plausibility standard and the differences between standards that have emerged from these reassessments.
A. PLEADING IN FEDERAL COURTS: THE PLAUSIBILITY
STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) first
13
took effect in 1938. One of the central features of these Feder14
al Rules was the liberal pleading practice they encouraged.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
13. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004 (3d ed. 2011) (detailing the history of the
drafting and enactment of the Federal Rules).
14. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
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Prior to the Federal Rules, pleading was a technical process
15
that often resulted in dismissal due to procedural missteps.
However, under the Federal Rules, a complaint is sufficient so
long as it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim
16
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” For example, a complaint of negligence need only state: “On date, at
place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against
the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured,
lost wages or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and
17
incurred expenses of $.” Thus, Rule 8(a)(2) only requires that
the plaintiff give the defendant notice of the plaintiff’s allega18
tions and the grounds for those allegations. The general purpose of this liberal requirement is to encourage adjudication
based on the merits of the facts and evidence, and to avoid
technicality-based dismissal before those merits have a chance
19
to be heard.
To challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim up20
on which relief can be granted.” When granted, the plaintiff
21
generally has a chance to amend the complaint.
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (reporting
that “[g]eneralized pleadings, broad discovery, and limited summary judgment
became integral, interdependent elements of the pretrial process”).
15. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1218 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that the distinctions between
“facts,” “evidence,” and “conclusions” that were the hallmarks of code pleading
resulted in “traps for the unwary or the inexperienced pleader and tactical advantages for the adroit pleader that were unrelated to the merits of the particular case”).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. The forms appended to the Federal Rules are
intended serve as examples of what the rules require. See FED. R. CIV. P. 84
(“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”).
18. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (stating that “all the Rules
require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests”).
19. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and
Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 557–58 (2010) (noting that
the purpose behind the language choice in Rule 8(a)(2) was “an attempt to create a standard that would reach the merits of a dispute rather than one that
would terminate a plaintiff’s case on technical grounds at the outset”); see also
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (emphasizing that
dismissing a case due to pleading insufficiency results in depriving the plaintiff “of his day in court”).
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
21. See, e.g., Polich v. Burlington N., Inc., 942 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir.

2013]

PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD

2383

In two recent cases, the Supreme Court addressed the
proper standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a
claim. In Twombly, the Court dismissed a Sherman Act complaint that lacked sufficient facts to show that the defendants’
anticompetitive conduct was intentional rather than a product
22
of coincidental “independent action.” In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Court dismissed a Bivens action alleging unconstitutional
treatment based on race because the complaint lacked “any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ dis23
criminatory state of mind.”
In the process of dismissing these claims, the Court conducted in-depth analyses of the proper pleading practices in
federal courts, and employed new language, holding that a
24
complaint must be “plausible on its face.” Emphasizing precedent and commentary, the Court held that a legally sufficient
complaint must rise above mere speculation of wrongdoing and
must contain more than a bare “recitation of a cause of action’s
25
elements.” To meet these requirements the complaint must
contain enough factual content to “nudge” the claim “across the
26
line from conceivable to plausible.” This “nudge” takes the
form of an inference; a claim is plausible when “the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon27
duct alleged.”
Between Twombly and Iqbal, two major aspects of pleading
practices emerge. First, both opinions employ pleading standards as a method of controlling discovery costs and abuse. According to the Court, the cost of discovery encourages defendants to settle claims, even where the complaint may be
28
frivolous. And in both cases, the Court rejected the adequacy
of discovery management techniques as a method of limiting
29
such abuses. The plausibility standard, therefore, is necessary
1991) (ruling that “[d]ismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is
clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment”).
22. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
23. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009).
24. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
25. Id. at 545.
26. Id. at 570.
27. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
28. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (worrying that “the threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before
reaching those proceedings”).
29. See id. at 559 (arguing that because judicial management of discovery
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to curb discovery abuses by requiring complaints to meet a
threshold level of plausibility before granting plaintiffs access
30
to discovery procedures.
Second, the Court established a general framework for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint. First, the court brackets
31
any legal conclusions it finds within the complaint. Under
traditional motion-to-dismiss practice, only factual allegations
are entitled to a presumption of truth when determining the
32
sufficiency of a complaint. Thus, when assessing a complaint’s
facial plausibility, a court must first divest it of any conclusory
33
content. Second, the court proceeds to determine whether
34
those facts state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Under Iqbal, a claim is facially plausible when it provides a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
35
misconduct. This inference is informed by “judicial experience
36
and common sense.” Hence, in both Twombly and Iqbal, the
abuse has been “modest,” “[i]t is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a
plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the
discovery process through ‘careful case management’”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685
(arguing that deferring discovery for petitioners under the qualified immunity
doctrine would be fruitless because “it would prove necessary for petitioners
and their counsel to participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position”).
30. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“Probably, then, it is only by taking
care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we
can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery [in frivolous
cases].”).
31. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (stating that usual practice of “accept[ing]
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions” and that “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions”).
32. See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540 (1988) (stating
that on a motion to dismiss, “we accept all of the factual allegations in petitioners’ complaint as true and ask whether, in these circumstances, dismissal
of the complaint was appropriate”).
33. Precisely what constitutes a fact as opposed to a legal conclusion has
been the subject of some debate since Iqbal. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 14, at
24–25 (demonstrating that since Iqbal, the conclusion category is being applied to “allegations that one reasonably might classify as factual”). However,
this is an old debate, mirroring debates that coincided with the drafting of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook,
‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of Fact’, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 236–46 (1937) (arguing
the distinction between “statements of fact” and “mere conclusion of law” is
merely a difference of degree and that such distinctions “can do little more
than generate doubt and uncertainty and provoke controversy and litigation”).
34. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 679.
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Court dismissed the complaint, in part, because of “more like37
38
39
ly,” or “obvious alternative” explanations. If the factual allegations provide for an inference of wrong-doing, based on the
judge’s experience and common sense, the complaint will survive a motion to dismiss. If, on the other hand, there is no such
inference, a court will dismiss the complaint.
The Twombly-Iqbal approach to pleading generated substantial commentary. Many—though not all—commentators
40
read plausibility as a shift in pleading standards. Accordingly,
state courts are increasingly asked to decide between “notice”
41
and “plausibility” pleading.
B. STATE COURTS RESPOND TO PLAUSIBILITY
Although some state courts have accepted plausibility as
42
the proper standard, a majority of state appellate courts have
43
either rejected the plausibility standard or declined to apply
37. Id. at 681.
38. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567–68 (2007).
39. In Twombly, the Court dismissed the case in large part because there
were more natural explanations for the service providers’ conduct than anticompetitive agreements. Specifically, the Court argued that because these
companies were originally “born” into a world filled with monopolies, the companies were likely more comfortable refraining from competition. See id. Similarly, in Iqbal, the Court argued that “[i]t should come as no surprise that a
legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to
target neither Arabs nor Muslims.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. Because this is a
more “likely” alternative explanation, the Court decided that “discrimination
is not a plausible conclusion.” See id.
40. Compare, e.g., Miller, supra note 14, at 10 (arguing that after
Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]o a significant degree, the liberal-procedure ethos of
1938 has given way to a restrictive one”), with Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have
Federal Pleading All Figured Out, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 453, 455 (2010)
(arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal probably
did not result in a significant change in the overall federal-court pleading
scheme”).
41. See, e.g., Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346
S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tenn. 2011) (“We decline to adopt the new plausibility
standard and adhere . . . to the notice pleading standard . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass.
2008) (adopting Twombly’s “refinement” of Conley); Doe v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Neb., 788 N.W.2d 264, 277–78 (Neb. 2010) (concluding that
Twombly “provides a balanced approach for determining whether a complaint
should survive a motion to dismiss”); Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 809
(S.D. 2008) (adopting the plausibility standard).
43. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 345 (Ariz. 2008) (rejecting Twombly); Century Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hold-
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44

it. This Part examines three important themes that have
emerged from recent decisions in these states. First, some
states reject Twombly and Iqbal’s strict fact-conclusion dichotomy. Second, some state courts consider it improper to apply
judicial experience and common sense to determine a complaint’s sufficiency. Last, some state courts are not convinced
that discovery management should be a central policy informing their pleading doctrines. This discussion concludes that by
rejecting the plausibility standard, state courts aim to permit
more plaintiffs to access discovery procedures and have the
merits of their complaints tested.
1. Rejecting Iqbal’s Fact-Conclusion Dichotomy
While Iqbal and Twombly require a court to parse through
45
each section of a complaint and disregard every conclusion,
state courts tend to reject this strict dichotomy. Most dramatically, in West Virginia “a plaintiff is not required to set out
46
facts upon which the claim is based.” Similarly, a number of
states only require “allegations from which an inference may
ings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 2011) (holding that “the governing pleading
standard in Delaware . . . is reasonable ‘conceivability’” not plausibility); Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608
(Iowa 2012) (rejecting the plausibility standard); Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co.,
285 P.3d 494, 500 (Mont. 2012) (holding that determining the sufficiency of a
complaint under Montana law is “distinct from the issue” of a complaint’s sufficiency under the plausibility standard); Madrid v. Vill. of Chama, 283 P.3d
871, 876 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting the plausibility standard); Sacksteder
v. Senney, No. 24993, 2012 WL 4480695, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2012)
(holding that it was error for the trial court to apply the plausibility standard);
Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 430 (rejecting the plausibility standard); Colby v. Umbrella, 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008) (declaring that Vermont courts “are
in no way bound by federal jurisprudence in interpreting our state pleading
rules” and affirming Vermont’s “notice pleading” standard); McCurry v. Chevy
Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864 (Wash. 2010) (refusing to adopt the plausibility standard); Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 189–90 n.4 (W.
Va. 2010) (distinguishing between the plausibility standard and West Virginia’s “fair notice” standard); Syed v. Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, Inc., No.
090467, 2012 WL 6738436, at *4 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 31, 2012) (rejecting the plausibility standard).
44. See Crum v. Johns Manville, Inc., 19 So. 3d 208, 212–13 n.2 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009) (explaining that the plausibility standard does not apply unless the
Alabama Supreme Court chooses to adopt it); Smith v. State, No. 104775, 2012
WL 1072756, at *7 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2012) (declining to apply the plausibility standard without authorization from the state legislature or the Supreme Court of Kansas).
45. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
46. Roth, 700 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan
Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 516, 522 (W. Va. 1995)).
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fairly be drawn that evidence on . . . material points will be in47
troduced at trial.” Allegations that may be more conclusory
than factual are, nevertheless, permitted so long as it is fair to
infer that supporting evidence will be provided in the future.
Although the Supreme Court of Tennessee acknowledged that a
court is not required to accept the veracity of so-called conclu48
sions, this is not the same as the federal requirement to disre49
gard them. By rejecting the strict fact-conclusion dichotomy,
these state pleading standards are designed to allow more
complaints to proceed than would be permitted under the plausibility standard.
2. Excluding Judicial Experience and Common Sense
State courts also tend to disavow Iqbal’s plausibility prong.
While Iqbal requires application of judicial experience and
50
common sense and requires “more than the mere possibility of
51
misconduct,” Washington courts simply ask “if it is possible
that facts could be established to support the allegations in the
52
complaint.” Similarly, courts in Arizona and Tennessee are
53
restricted to “an examination of the pleadings alone.” By restricting their pleading standard to the contents of the complaint, these states prohibit the court from weighing external
considerations such as judicial experience and common sense.
Restricting a court’s analysis to the four corners of the
pleading also serves to permit more complaints to proceed to
discovery. Significantly, the McCurry court argued that apply47. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 427 (quoting Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 92
(Tenn. 2004)); see also Cullen, 189 P.3d at 346 (“Courts must also assume the
truth of the well-pled factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences
therefrom.”); Smith, 2012 WL 1072756, at *7 (stating that the first task when
assessing a complaint’s sufficiency is to “accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, along with any inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
48. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 427 (clarifying that “courts are not required to
accept as true assertions that are merely legal arguments or ‘legal conclusions’”).
49. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (asserting that mere
conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth”).
50. See id. (describing the process of assessing a claim’s plausibility as involving application of “judicial experience and common sense”).
51. Id.
52. McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 862 (Wash. 2010)
(emphasis in original).
53. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 426; see also Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189
P.3d 344, 346 (Ariz. 2008) (“Arizona courts look only to the pleading itself and
consider the well-pled factual allegations contained therein.”).
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ing experience or common sense may result in dismissal of legally sufficient complaints because the judge nevertheless be54
lieves the claim is implausible. Whereas federal courts should
dismiss claims where experience or common sense suggests
55
more likely explanations for the defendant’s conduct, Tennessee and Washington courts consider such determinations inappropriate because they are external to the complaint and irrelevant to the question of its legal sufficiency. Like their rejection
of the fact-conclusion dichotomy, these states worry that the
plausibility standard would narrow the range of complaints
that could survive a motion to dismiss. These courts emphasize
that because plausibility looks beyond the complaint itself, that
standard enhances the risk of denying a remedy despite the
56
truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.
3. Deemphasizing Discovery Concerns
Different policy concerns inform state pleading rules than
those that inform the Federal Rule. Most importantly, while
Iqbal and Twombly sought to protect defendants from the costs
associated with unwarranted discovery abuse, many state
courts remain unconvinced that discovery costs justify a nar57
rower pleading standard. Most notably, the Supreme Court of
54. See McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863 (arguing that the plausibility standard
“adds a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits, so that a trial
judge can dismiss a claim, even where the law does provide a remedy for the
conduct alleged by the plaintiff, if that judge does not believe it is plausible the
claim will ultimately succeed”); Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183,
197 (W. Va. 2010) (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (worrying that applying judicial
experience and common sense requires “a judge to make a value determination on the likelihood of whether a claim will ultimately succeed or not before
meaningful discovery occurs, even if the law provides a remedy for the conduct
alleged” and observing that a variety across levels of judicial experience may
create inconsistency).
55. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
56. McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863 (observing that the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim “weeds out complaints where, even if what the plaintiff
alleges is true, the law does not provide a remedy” and that the plausibility
standard adds to this “a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits”).
57. See Hawkeye Foodservices Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812
N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa 2012) (remaining unpersuaded that Iowa courts face
“systemic” discovery pressures); McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863 (concluding that
discovery abuse is not sufficiently prevalent in Washington courts to justify a
shift in pleading practices); Syed v. Mobile Oil Mariana Islands, Inc., No.
090467, 2012 WL 6738436, at *4 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 31, 2012) (“[W]e are not
aware of any evidence demonstrating the presence of rampant discovery abuse
by plaintiffs in the Commonwealth that would justify adopting the ‘plausibil-

2013]

PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD

2389

Tennessee has articulated the policies that broader pleading
rules pursue. First, the court emphasized the virtue of maintaining the status quo which “allows individuals to plan their
58
affairs and to safely judge of their legal rights.” Second, courts
should emphasize merit-based outcomes over the relative costs
of that process and should conservatively protect the constitu59
tional right to a jury trial. Lastly, the court worried that the
federal standard would limit access to state courts when the
plaintiff has limited access to the facts necessary to state a
60
plausible claim. By emphasizing the rights and policies that
broader pleading rules protect and deemphasizing discovery
protections, these state court standards inevitably serve to
permit more claims to proceed to discovery.
State courts have developed lower standards of pleading
which reject the notion of plausibility and express a number of
unique policies. Underlying each of the policies is a single value: allowing plaintiffs who may not yet have all the facts necessary to support their claim to access discovery procedures rather than risk terminating a potentially valid claim
61
prematurely. This difference between state and federal pleading standards is important for determining the validity of the
federal plausibility standard under the REA.
These state opinions rejecting the plausibility standard
have also created significant disuniformity between state and
federal pleading standards. Some have projected that as this
disuniformity evolves, federal courts will be asked with increasing frequency to apply state pleading standards in diversity
62
cases. Indeed, such requests have already emerged on a limity’ standard.”).
58. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. See id. at 432 (arguing that the application of judicial experience and
common sense to weigh a complaint’s facts “conflicts with the strong preference . . . that cases stating a valid legal claim brought by Tennessee citizens be
decided on their merits,” which “raises potential concerns implicating the
Tennessee [c]onstitutional mandate that the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
60. See id. at 434–35 (listing types of claims which involve “information
asymmetry” between the parties and worrying that these types of cases are
particularly vulnerable to pre-discovery dismissal under the plausibility
standard).
61. See, e.g., Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 197 (W. Va. 2010)
(Benjamin, J., dissenting) (“I believe we must also be weary [sic] of a procedure which could be harsh on pro se litigants or otherwise be viewed as imposing unnecessary hurdles at the courthouse door to the substantial rights of
parties.”).
62. See Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading
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63

ited scale. In order to answer whether a state or federal law
applies in a diversity case, federal courts look to the Erie doctrine.
II. WHEN DO FEDERAL RULES DISPLACE STATE RULES?
To understand how federal courts will treat conflicting
pleading rules in diversity cases, this Part introduces the modern Erie doctrine, focusing primarily on the REA and the
Court’s most recent attempt to interpret it in Shady Grove. After introducing the doctrine, this Part highlights the differences
between Shady Grove’s plurality and concurring opinions and
argues that Justice Stevens’s opinion presents a more accurate
textual reading of the REA and is not the radical departure
from precedent that Justice Scalia paints it to be.
A. CONFLICTED FEDERAL RULES AND THE REA
What is commonly referred to as the Erie doctrine, is actually two distinct lines of case law, one evolving out of Erie Rail64
65
road Co. v. Tompkins and the Rules of Decision Act (RDA),
66
and the other evolving out of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and the
67
REA. Though both doctrines address vertical conflicts of law,
68
each does so in a different context. When there is a vertical
Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2008)
(claiming that many states “now face the choice of whether to stand or break
with Conley notice pleading”); Michalski, supra note 5, at 109 (“Other states
will have to decide the same issue in the months and years to come.”).
63. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *20, Seattle Collision Ctr., Inc. v.
Am. States Ins. Co., 2011 WL 1155275 (No. 10-1189) (arguing that both the
District Court for the Western District of Washington and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the federal plausibility standard
instead of the Washington state pleading standard), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2936 (2011); Brief for Appellants at *10–11, G&S Holdings LLC v. Cont. Cas.
Co., 2011 WL 4542825 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1813) (arguing that Erie commands the application of a state pleading standard when a case is removed
from a state court to federal court).
64. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several states . . . shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States
. . . .”).
66. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 is valid because it “really regulates procedure”).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (delegating to the Supreme Court Congress’s
power to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure” and requiring that
“[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”).
68. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–71 (1965) (arguing that the
Erie doctrine is not the “appropriate test of the validity and therefore the ap-

2013]

PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD

2391

conflict created by federal judge-made law, the RDA, as interpreted by Erie and other cases, instructs a federal court to apply state law to the extent that this choice of law minimizes fo69
70
rum shopping, enables equitable administration of the law,
71
and does not disrupt supervening federal interests. On the
other hand, if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure creates the conflict, the REA instructs federal courts to apply that rule unless
72
it is not arguably procedural or it “abridges, enlarges or modi73
fies any substantive right.” To demonstrate how courts should
answer the question of conflicting pleading rules, this Part fur74
ther introduces the modern REA analysis. It then examines
the recent Shady Grove decision and the diverging approaches
contained therein.
When a federal procedural rule creates a vertical conflict of
law, courts determine that rule’s validity according to the REA.
Pursuant to its constitutional power to create and maintain a
75
system of federal courts and the Necessary and Proper
plicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure” and that the proper test is “the
scope of the [Rules] Enabling Act and the constitutionality of specific Federal
Rules”); see also John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 693, 718 (1974) (arguing that “Hanna’s main point, however, was that
when the application of a Federal Rule is at issue, the Rules Enabling Act—
and not the Rules of Decision Act as construed by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and
other cases—should determine whether federal or state law is to be applied”).
69. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–68 (arguing that “choices between state
and federal law are to be made . . . by reference to the policies underlying the
Erie rule” and identifying “discouragement of forum-shopping” as one of those
policies).
70. See id. at 468 (identifying “avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws” as the other policy “underlying the Erie rule”).
71. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538
(1958) (ruling that “the inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury
decisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way
in the federal court and another way in the state court”).
72. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 (articulating the constitutional authority
to create procedural rules as being limited to the “power to regulate matters
which . . . are rationally capable of classification as either” substantive or procedural).
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (instructing the Supreme Court not to
create procedural rules which “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right”).
74. Because the Court’s RDA analysis does not apply where there is a controlling rule of federal procedure, and because pleading in federal courts is
controlled by Rule 8(a)(2), this Note does not further analyze the scope or implications of the RDA.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in . . . such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
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76

Clause, Congress enacted the REA, which delegates to the
Supreme Court the congressional power to prescribe a system
of procedural and evidentiary rules applicable in all district
77
courts. However, the Supreme Court cannot use this power to
hide substantive law in a procedural code; all procedural rules
must abide by both clauses of the REA.
The REA’s first clause—“the enabling clause”—gives the
78
Supreme Court the power to create procedural rules. Although Congress delegated its rule-making responsibility to the
Supreme Court, that power remains Congress’s and, therefore,
79
no Federal Rule may exceed Congress’s power over procedure.
As the Supreme Court has admitted, however, the distinction
between procedure and substance cannot be maintained con80
sistently. Rather than drawing a hard line between procedure
and substance, the Court has stated that Congress’s power to
create procedural rules “includes a power to regulate matters
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as
81
either.” In other words, so long as a rule is “rationally capable
of classification as procedur[al],” it is constitutionally valid and
82
does not violate the REA’s enabling clause.
The REA’s second clause—“the limiting clause”—states
that no promulgated rule may “abridge, enlarge or modify any
83
substantive right.” Thus, like the enabling clause, the limiting
84
clause draws a distinction between substance and procedure.
time ordain and establish.”).
76. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (vesting in Congress the power “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
78. Id. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases
in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate
judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”).
79. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (“Neither
‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.”).
81. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (emphasis added).
82. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1442 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
84. See Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act
and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation,
93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 35–42 (2008) (analyzing possible interpretations of the
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To determine whether or not a rule is procedural or substantive
under the limiting clause, a court will ask whether it “really
regulates procedure[]—the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
85
them.” As some have noted, this test appears tautological, i.e.,
86
“a matter is procedural if, by revelation, it is procedural.”
However, the Court does not appear to struggle in its application. Indeed, the Court has never found a Federal Rule to vio87
late either the enabling clause or the limiting clause.
If a Federal Rule creates a vertical conflict of law, a court
will ensure that the rule complies with both of the REA’s clauses. Clear as this test appears, the most recent Erie decision—
Shady Grove—demonstrates that there is considerable disagreement within the Court concerning how to apply multiple
88
steps of the analysis.
B. SHADY GROVE
Shady Grove was a class action to recover unpaid “statutory” interest accrued on overdue insurance claim payments that
Allstate Insurance Company allegedly routinely refused to
89
pay. The District Court dismissed the class action because
under the New York procedural rules a class cannot recover a
REA implicated by its “procedural-substantive tension”).
85. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
86. See, e.g., 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509 (3d ed. 2011).
87. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442, (observing that the Court has
“rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule”).
88. This disagreement begins when determining whether state and federal rules actually conflict. Compare id. at 1437–42 (holding that Rule 23 and
the applicable state rule do conflict because they both address “whether a class
action may proceed for a given suit” and criticizing the dissent’s approach to
the question because it would produce “confusion worse confounded” (internal
quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 1461–69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should avoid “immoderate interpretations of the Federal
Rules that would trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest” and that the majority “finds conflict where none is
necessary”). The Court’s disagreement further extends to the importance of
the state’s purposes in creating the rule. Compare id. at 1442–48 (arguing that
the proper REA analysis “leaves no room for special exemptions based on the
function or purpose of the state rule”), with id. at 1448–56 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Rule Enabling Act commands the Court to show
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89. Id. at 1436.
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90

“penalty.” The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that although
Federal Rule 23 would permit the class action to proceed, the
federal class action rule does not address the question of statutory penalties and therefore did not actually conflict with the
91
state law. Because the Second Circuit determined that New
York’s prohibition of class recovery of penalties was substantive
and not procedural, the state law applied in federal court under
92
Erie and the REA. The Supreme Court overruled, holding that
Rule 23 did address the question of statutory penalties because
it allowed all class actions to proceed so long as the Rule’s re93
quirements are met. Further, the Court held that Rule 23
does not violate the terms of the REA and therefore was valid
94
and operated to displace New York’s rule in federal courts.
Though a majority of Justices agreed that Rule 23 was valid
and controlled the action before it, only a plurality agreed on
how to determine the validity of federal rules against their conflicting state counterparts under the REA.
Justice Scalia nicely articulated the point of contention between himself and Justice Stevens: “compliance of a federal
rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed by consulting the
95
Rule itself, and not its effects in individual applications.” According to Justice Scalia, the measure of a federal rule is simp96
ly whether or not it “really regulates procedure.” Federal rules
97
are either valid or not; any REA analysis should focus on the
90. Id. at 1437.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1442 (“Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any
federal civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule’s prerequisites
are met.”); see also id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that Rule 23
squarely answers the question of class certification in federal courts; “[t]hat is
the explicit function of Rule 23”). The Shady Grove dissent disagreed on this
point. See id. at 1461–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
argued that the Court has consistently read federal rules narrowly to avoid
conflict with state rules and since Rule 23 does not explicitly address the type
of remedies available, it should similarly be read narrowly to avoid conflict
with a state rule that limits the remedies available. See id.
94. Id. at 1443 (holding that Rule 23 is valid under the REA’s enabling
clause, “at least insofar as it allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate
claims against the same defendants in a class action”); see also id. at 1457
(Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that it is “hard to see how § 901(b) could be
understood as a rule that, though procedural in form, serves the function of
defining New York’s rights or remedies”).
95. Id. at 1444.
96. Id. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
97. See id. at 1444 (arguing that “[a] Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others”).
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content of the federal rule, without consideration of state rules
98
or rights. If a federal rule “regulates procedure . . . it is authorized by § 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect
to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect on state-created
99
rights.” Thus, the content of a state rule and whether it is
100
“substantive” or “procedural” is irrelevant. Under the REA,
therefore, a federal rule is invalid only if the alleged substan101
tive transgression occurs on the face of the rule itself. This is
incredibly unlikely because, as the Court previously observed, a
facially invalid rule implies that “the Advisory Committee, [the
102
Supreme] Court, and Congress erred in” enacting the rule.
Justice Stevens, by contrast, reads the REA as allowing for
as-applied challenges to federal rules. He reads the limiting
clause as reflecting Congress’s desire to respect each state’s
“definition of its own rights or remedies,” and a federal rule
which interferes with the scope of these rights or remedies is
103
invalid. Because a federal rule’s validity is measured by reference to the content of particular state rights, the REA per104
mits case-specific, as-applied challenges.
Justice Stevens’s
approach recognizes that although a state rule may take a pro105
cedural form, it nevertheless may be “so bound up with the
state-created right or remedy that it defines the scope of that
106
substantive right or remedy.” In such instances, the REA

98. See id. at 1442 (“What matters is what the rule itself regulates.”).
99. Id. at 1444.
100. Id. (arguing that “it is not the substantive or procedural nature of
purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule”).
101. See Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and
Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2011) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s focus on “[t]he word ‘itself’ signals, albeit faintly, a distinction between facial challenges (i.e., the rule itself) and as-applied challenges (i.e., the effect of
applying the rule in a particular context)”).
102. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
103. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing
that the REA’s substantive rights limitation “means only that federal rules
cannot displace a State’s definition of its own rights or remedies”).
104. See id. at 1449–50 (claiming that the REA analysis is “applied to diversity cases” and “requires careful interpretation of the state and federal provisions at issue”).
105. See id. at 1450 (recognizing that states may choose “to use a traditionally procedural vehicle as a means of defining the scope of substantive rights
or remedies”).
106. Id.
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does not authorize application of a federal rule which would
modify state rights.
While Justice Stevens would allow plaintiffs to bring asapplied challenges to particular federal rules, Justice Scalia rejects this approach. Because only some states have rejected the
plausibility standard, plaintiffs can only succeed in challenging
the plausibility standard’s validity if courts permit them to
bring as-applied challenges under the REA.
C. THE REA AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
Although there is a well-established analytical framework
in REA cases, the Shady Grove opinion revealed that there is
substantial disagreement as to the scope and meaning of the
REA’s substantive rights limitation. This Part compares and
contrasts Justice Scalia’s and Justice Stevens’s interpretations
of the REA and argues that Justice Stevens’s approach shows
greater fidelity to both Supreme Court precedent and the REA’s
text.
1. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and As-Applied Challenges
In Shady Grove, both Justice Scalia and Stevens discussed
the Court’s interpretation of the REA in Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co. While Justice Scalia reads Sibbach as barring any asapplied test to the validity of a federal rule, Justice Stevens
reads Sibbach as upholding Federal Rules 35 and 37 against a
facial challenge, thereby leaving room for litigants to challenge
the validity of a federal rule in specific applications.
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., the petitioner had sought
107
damages for injuries sustained within the state of Indiana.
Pursuant to Federal Rule 35, the federal district court, which
sat in Illinois, ordered Sibbach to submit to physical examina108
tions to assess the injuries alleged. When Sibbach refused to
109
comply, the Court found Sibbach guilty of contempt. At that
110
time, the Illinois state courts did not permit such orders.
State courts in Indiana, however, followed the Federal Rule,
111
and would have permitted a similar order. To avoid the sanctions imposed, Sibbach argued that Rules 35 and 37 exceeded
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 4 (1941).
Id.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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the rule-making power delegated by Congress through the
112
REA.
Sibbach, however, had brought an ill-fated appeal. If she
succeeded in invalidating the Federal Rules, the RDA would
113
dictate that Indiana law controlled, not Illinois law. Thus,
Sibbach would have been subject to compelled examination and
potential sanctions whether or not her appeal succeeded. To
avoid this result, Sibbach ignored the applicable state laws entirely. Instead, she conceded that Rules 35 and 37 were procedural, but insisted that they so intruded upon rights that generally were “important or substantial,” so as to violate the
114
REA’s limiting clause. Thus, Sibbach urged the Court to invalidate Rules 35 and 37 because the Rules themselves—
without any examination of conflicting state law—transgressed
important substantive rights. In other words, Sibbach brought
115
a facial challenge to Rules 35 and 37.
The Court easily rejected Sibbach’s argument for the simple reason that Sibbach failed to identify any particular body of
law that protected the supposedly important rights at issue. In
the Court’s words, the rights Sibbach identified were
116
“[r]ecognized where and by whom?” Permitting a federal rule
to be invalidated based on how important an unidentified right
117
is would result in “confusion worse confounded” because in
the absence of any applicable law there is no standard to determine whether a rule is important enough to remain inviolate
against federal rulemaking. In the absence of any particular
substantive right that a federal rule supposedly violates, the
REA’s limiting clause simply applies to the face of the federal
rule in question and the only remaining standard to assess the
118
rule’s validity is whether it “really regulates procedure.”
112. Id. at 7–8.
113. Id. at 10–11.
114. Id. at 11.
115. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1454 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that in Sibbach “[t]he petitioner raised only the facial question whether ‘Rules 35 and 37 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] are . . . within the mandate of Congress to this
Court’ and not the specific question of ‘the obligation of federal courts to apply
the substantive law of a state’” (alteration in original)).
116. Id. at 13.
117. Id. at 14.
118. Id.; see also Ides, supra note 101, at 1057 (arguing that the “really
regulates procedure” test should only be read as a “tag” on the Court’s rejection of Sibbach’s argument that important rights which are not recognized by
any particular body of law can serve as the basis for an REA challenge).
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Ignoring the fact that Sibbach involved a facial rather than
an as-applied challenge, Justice Scalia reads Sibbach as reject119
ing any “test that turns on the idiosyncrasies of state law.”
Hence, he states that Justice Stevens’s approach to the REA
120
would require overturning Sibbach. This criticism is misplaced, however, because Sibbach did not hold that litigants
could not bring as-applied challenges under the REA; there was
no such challenge at issue. At most, Sibbach held that in order
to implicate the REA’s limiting clause, a litigant must identify
a substantive right recognized somewhere by someone that the
federal rule in question allegedly transgresses. As-applied challenges satisfy Sibbach’s rule so long as they identify a particular state right that the federal rule in question transgresses.
In fact, Justice Scalia agrees that exclusive focus on the
federal rule is difficult to square with the REA’s limiting
121
clause. But, he goes on to argue, Congress never modified the
122
REA in light of Sibbach’s holding. Moreover, allowing for asapplied challenges would produce endless litigation over “hundreds of hard questions” rather than the “single hard question”
123
of a federal rule’s facial validity. But, as Justice Stevens
pointed out, “[t]he question is what rule Congress estab124
lished,”
and as Sibbach suggests, that rule—the REA—
permits as-applied challenges.
2. Substance and Procedure in the REA
The meaning of “substance” and “procedure” in the REA is
125
contentious and well beyond the scope of this Note. It is clear,
however, that the statute expresses a particular relationship
between the concepts; namely, a relationship that is not mutually exclusive. The REA’s enabling clause delegates to the
126
Court the power to create rules that are “procedural.” The
119. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445.
120. Id. (“In reality, the concurrence seeks not to apply Sibbach, but to
overrule it (or, what is the same, to rewrite it).”).
121. Id. at 1445–46 (“[I]t is hard to understand how it can be determined
whether a federal rule ‘abridges’ or ‘modifies’ substantive rights without knowing what state-created rights would obtain if the federal rule did not exist.”).
122. See id. at 1446 (asserting that “Congress remains free to correct us
. . . and adhering to our precedent allows it to do so” (citation omitted)).
123. Id. at 1447.
124. Id. at 1454.
125. See Redish & Murashko, supra 84, at 27 (“To this day, no real consensus has developed as to how the Act should be interpreted.”).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power
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limiting clause excludes from this power any rule that would
127
transgress any substantive right. If the REA contemplated
mutually exclusive spheres named “substance” and “proce128
In other
dure,” the limiting clause would be redundant.
words, the power to promulgate rules of procedure would, by
definition, not include the power to promulgate substantive
rules. Unless one is willing to accept an expressly redundant
statute, the REA must be read as permitting the promulgation
of a certain set of rules collectively named “procedure,” that
nevertheless have the potential to modify a certain set of rights
which the statute calls “substantive.”
Justice Scalia’s reading of the REA applies mutually exclusive conceptions of “substance” and “procedure” against the
REA. “[T]he validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon
whether it regulates procedure. If it does, it is authorized by
129
§ 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions . . . .” However, as Professor John Hart Ely observed, any determination of a federal
rule’s validity derived solely from classifying it as substantive
130
or procedural “collapses” the two REA requirements into one.
By treating rules that fit within the scope of the statute’s enabling clause as necessarily incapable of violating its limiting
clause, Justice Scalia renders the latter toothless and construes
131
it “as nothing more than a restatement of the first.”
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, fashions a test that
gives full effect to both clauses. Where an ostensibly procedural
federal rule is “intimately bound up in the scope of a substan132
tive right or remedy,” it is not authorized by the REA. At the
same time, Justice Stevens does not allow this limitation to
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United
States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.” (emphasis added)).
127. Id. § 2072(b) (2006) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.” (emphasis added)).
128. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 84, at 28 (arguing that under “the
notion of mutual exclusivity of procedure and substance . . . the [REA’s] second
provision effectively serves solely to place emphasis on the first”).
129. Shady Grove, 103 S. Ct. at 1444 (citations omitted).
130. Ely, supra note 68, at 719 (arguing that under Sibbach “the Act’s two
questions were collapsed into one”). Like Justice Scalia, Professor Ely misread
Sibbach as rejecting as-applied challenges of federal rules. However, unlike
Justice Scalia, Professor Ely does not advocate this position. See id. at 722 (arguing that if Sibbach’s “wholesale defeat of the Enabling Act is to be avoided,
[the statute’s] interpretation must be geared . . . to the character of the state
provision that enforcement of the Federal Rule in question will supplant”).
131. Redish & Murashko, supra note 84, at 28.
132. Shady Grove, 103 S. Ct. at 1458 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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swallow the enabling clause. A federal rule is only invalid if
there is “little doubt” that its application will actually alter the
133
scope of state rights. In this way, Justice Stevens gives full
effect to both the REA’s clauses and, therefore, presents a more
accurate reading of the statute.
III. OBJECTING TO THE PLAUSIBILTY STANDARD IN
FEDERAL COURTS
Justice Stevens’s approach to determining the validity of a
Federal Rule requires examining the conflicted state rule and
any substantive policies or rights that it may engender or
transgress. His concurrence does not, however, clarify when
exactly a state procedural rule should be considered sufficiently
interwoven with substantive law to render its displacement a
violation of the REA. This Part demonstrates that the state
pleading standards examined in certain state courts are sufficiently substantive to limit the plausibility standard’s applicability. This Part then responds to likely objections to this conclusion, specifically that varied pleading standards undermine
the goals of procedural uniformity and litigation on the merits
of each case in federal courts. Lastly, this Part explains how
applying such substantive state pleading standards in diversity
cases resolves a troubling forum shopping problem raised by
vertically disuniform pleading standards.
A. PLEADING “BOUND UP WITH” SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
As argued above, there is an as-applied violation of the
REA where application of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
134
serves to “define the scope of the state-created right.” According to Justice Stevens, this determination should be made with
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory poli135
cies.” Significantly, he clarifies that “[s]uch laws . . . may be
seemingly procedural rules that make it significantly more dif136
ficult to bring . . . a claim.”
Thus, a heightened pleading
standard appears to be precisely the type of rule that Justice
Stevens thinks could be vulnerable to an as-applied challenge.
This Part argues that no matter how one defines the word
“substantive,” application of a federal pleading standard which
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1457.
Id. at 1452.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1450 (emphasis added).
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is higher than its state counterpart in a diversity case violates
the REA’s limiting clause.
According to some broad definitions of “substance,” pleading standards that engender particular state policies would
constitute “substantive rights.” For example, one very broad
definition of “substantive” proposes to encompass rights whose
application would evoke “organized political attention of a
group of litigants or prospective litigants who (reasonably)
137
claim to be specially and adversely affected by the rule.”
Thus, a state court’s decision to apply a lower pleading standard in order to provide sufficient courthouse access to a class of
138
potential plaintiffs can be read as recognizing a substantive
right.
Another slightly narrower definition of substantive rights
reaches a similar conclusion. Professor Ely, for example, defined substantive rights as those recognized “for some purpose
or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of
139
the litigation process.” Thus, a state which chooses to apply a
lower pleading standard in order to protect the expectations
140
and affairs of its local citizens can also be thought of as recognizing a substantive right. Under both of these broad definitions of “substantive rights,” application of the plausibility
standard would violate the terms of the REA’s limiting clause
because it would directly constrict a substantive right that the
state pleading rule engenders.
Other, more restrictive definitions, however, may initially
appear to exclude such engendered policies from the definition
137. Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 308 (1989) (describing Walter Wheeler Cook’s
definition of substance and procedure).
138. See Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d
422, 434 (Tenn. 2011) (citing concern over “information asymmetry” inherent
to certain types of claims, “including actions for violations of civil rights, employment discrimination, antitrust, and conspiracy”); McCurry v. Chevy Chase
Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash. 2010) (emphasizing access to the court
“particularly in cases where evidence is almost exclusively in the possession of
defendants”); Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 196–97 (W. Va. 2010)
(Benjamin, J., dissenting) (worrying about the plausibility standard’s impact
on pro se litigants); Syed v. Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, Inc., No. 090467, 2012
WL 6738436, at *4 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 31, 2012) (concluding that to adopt a
heightened pleading standard “would prematurely close the doors of justice on
plaintiffs”).
139. Ely, supra note 68, at 725 (emphasis added).
140. See Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 431 (emphasizing stable procedural rules because “[s]tability in the law allows individuals to plan their affairs and to safely judge of their legal rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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of “substantive rights.” One could imagine, for example, a definition of substantive rights limited only to those laws that create a cause of action. Or, less narrowly, rules that have a greater than incidental impact on activities “beyond the courthouse
141
walls.” Under such definitions, a state that applies a particular pleading standard for the purposes of an open courthouse or
to protect a particular class of litigants is unlikely to be considered as recognizing substantive rights.
However, even under these more narrow definitions of substantive rights, the determination of a complaint’s plausibility
represents, in some cases, a transgression of other rights that
are substantive. As numerous state courts have worried, application of judicial experience and common sense, as required by
the plausibility standard, risks dismissing a legally sufficient
complaint simply because the judge does not believe it reaches
a threshold level of plausibility, or because there are more
142
plausible explanations for the alleged misconduct.
Even
where a complaint’s factual content, taken as true, satisfies the
elements of a cause of action and would therefore proceed in
state court, there remains the potential for dismissal in federal
143
court. In such instances, the federal pleading standard narrows the availability of a state-created substantive right or
cause of action. Thus, although Rule 8(a)(2) may be a classically
141. See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the
Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional
and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1333 (2006) (describing
the narrowest of three possible constructions of the REA).
142. See Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812
N.W.2d 600, 609 (Iowa 2012) (“The only issue when considering a motion to
dismiss is the petitioner’s right of access to the district court, not the merits of
his allegations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 437
(concluding that the pleading practice in Tennessee is “particularly ill-suited
for an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the merits or of the weight of
the facts pleaded”); McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863 (“The new Fed.R.Civ.P. [sic]
12(b)(6) standard effectively reads ‘plausible’ into the rule, as follows: ‘failure
to state a [plausible] claim upon which relief can be granted.’ This adds a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits, so that a trial judge can
dismiss a claim, even where the law does provide a remedy for the conduct alleged by the plaintiff, if that judge does not believe it is plausible the claim
will ultimately succeed.” (alteration in original)); Roth, 700 S.E.2d at 197 (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plausibility standard “seem[s] to require a judge to make a value determination on the likelihood of whether a
claim will ultimately succeed or not”).
143. See Miller, supra note 14, at 29 (arguing that “[i]f unconstrained, [application of the plausibility standard] allows judges to deny access to a merits
adjudication whenever an equivocal set of facts can be interpreted as ‘more
likely’ to reflect lawful conduct”).
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procedural rule and may not itself be substantive, its application through the plausibility standard clearly serves to define
the “scope” of other substantive rights at issue in certain diversity cases and, therefore, violates the REA’s limiting clause.
One of the likely unforeseen consequences of the Supreme
Court’s development of the plausibility standard is that it has
caused state courts to similarly reassess the process by which
they determine the sufficiency of a complaint. These state
courts have clarified the policies and rights implicated by local
pleading rules. The courts in Tennessee and Washington in
particular made clear that despite this inability to access certain “facts” which would otherwise be included in a complaint,
the pleading standard should not operate to prevent these
plaintiffs from pursuing their substantive rights in local
144
courts. In order to ensure broad court access for such plaintiffs, these courts retained a more liberal pleading standard
than the federal plausibility standard. In this sense, these opinions express the judgment that pursuit of substantive rights
should be available to all litigants, even those who cannot immediately plead particular types of facts.
Application of the federal standard in states emphasizing
these values is contrary to the REA’s limiting clause. As interpreted by the highest courts in these states, the local pleading
standard serves the policy of broad protection of the substantive law and therefore operates to determine the scope of states’
substantive rights and remedies. By effectively making it more
difficult for particular types of cases to be brought by particular
145
types of plaintiffs, application of the plausibility standard rather than the local standard would narrow the scope of the substantive law because it may entirely prevent certain types of
claims from proceeding.

144. See Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 434 (worrying that the plausibility standard
would result in a “disproportionate dismissal” of claims where there is an “information asymmetry” between the plaintiff and defendant); McCurry, 233
P.3d at 863 (questioning whether curbing discovery costs warrants decreasing
court access, “particularly in cases where evidence is almost exclusively in the
possession of defendants”).
145. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431,
459 (2008) (arguing that “plaintiffs may find that claims for which intent or
state of mind is an element—such as discrimination or conspiracy claims—are
more difficult to plead in a way that will satisfy the plausibility standard”).
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B. PROCEDURAL VALUES AGAINST THE REA’S TEXT
The strongest objection to applying state pleading standards in a diversity action is that this would undermine the value of procedural uniformity across district courts and across
types of claims within a particular district. As Justice Scalia
stated in Shady Grove, “[a] procedural rule is not valid in some
jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and
146
invalid in others . . . .” This objection emphasizes that one of
the original purposes of the Federal Rules and the REA was to
147
establish uniform procedural practices and standards. As the
argument goes, applying state pleading standards in a federal
court undermines this goal because district courts sitting in
states such as Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia
would apply a different standard than district courts sitting in
148
states such as Massachusetts. Moreover, within those districts, there would be internal or “transsubstantive”
disuniformity between diversity cases—where the state standard would apply—and non-diversity cases, where the federal
149
standard would remain in effect.
A second, more practical objection arises from the collateral effects of disuniform pleading standards: invalidating the
plausibility standard in a particular application opens the door
to costly and complex Erie disputes over the validity of other
federal rules. Invalidating a single procedural rule would cause
litigants to question the validity of many other rules and would
require courts to reconsider the substantive or procedural na150
ture of “countless state rules.” Invalidating particular applications the federal pleading standard would not only increase
federal litigation, it would weigh courts down in the complex
procedure-substance debate which has traditionally been troublesome. Lastly, such disputes detract from determining the
146. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1444 (2010).
147. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1015, 1040–42 (1982) (describing the earlier Conformity Act’s failure
to achieve a uniform procedure).
148. Compare, e.g., McCurry, 233 P.3d at 864 (refusing to adopt the plausibility standard), with Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890
(Mass. 2008) (adopting Twombly’s “refinement” of Conley).
149. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of ‘General
Rules,’ 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 536 (2009) (arguing that “the ‘general rules’ required by the 1934 Rules Enabling Act should not only be uniformly applicable
in all federal district courts, but uniformly applicable in all types of cases
(transsubstantive)”).
150. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447.
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merits of a case which, like procedural uniformity, is a central
151
tenet of the Federal Rules.
The response to these objections is two-fold. First, as Justice Stevens succinctly explained, “that inquiry is what the En152
abling Act requires.” In terms of procedural uniformity, the
REA states that no federal rule may modify “any substantive
153
right.” Thus, if a duly enacted federal rule would serve to
modify any substantive right, the REA’s limiting clause does
not authorize displacement of the state law. Similarly, the concern for avoiding complex Erie disputes is misplaced because
the substance-procedure determination is required by the
REA’s text, which limits the power to create procedural rules to
the extent they do not have substantive effects. Thus, if there is
a legitimate question regarding the substantive nature of a
particular displaced state right, the REA requires a resolution,
regardless of how much litigation it encourages or how complex
that question is.
Second, the ad hoc nature of determining the validity of
federal rules under as-applied challenges is a more effective
way to ensure compliance with the REA’s limiting clause. To be
prescribed, a proposed federal rule endures multiple stages of
154
revision and recommendation in successive committees. This
155
156
process requires that the public and “interested parties”
have notice and an opportunity to comment. No matter how
thorough such a vetting process may be, it is impractical and
unwise to require or presume that the public, experts, and
committees are capable of evaluating a proposed rule’s substan157
tive effect in every conceivable instance. Even the most thorough examination of a proposed rule’s effect will inevitably
leave some contexts unexamined. After all, as the Court has
151. See Burbank, supra note 147, at 1066–67 (reporting that prior to the
REA’s enactment, the ABA emphasized that procedural rules should pursue
litigation on the merits of each case).
152. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
154. See generally Nathan R. Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal
Civil Rulemaking Process: Why the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules
Through Judicial Interpretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 337–38 (2011) (describing the rules enactment process); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074.
155. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073(c)(1).
156. Id. § 2073(c)(2).
157. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 84, at 94 (arguing that the Federal Rules should not be presumed valid because the process of enacting a rule
“comes without a formalized and careful adversary presentation of all sides of
the issue of the rule’s validity”).
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repeatedly observed, the substantive or procedural nature of a
158
particular law varies across contexts. Litigation over such
questions shines light on contexts which were not addressed
during the rule’s proposal period. In this way, allowing litigants
to bring as-applied challenges supplements the process by
which federal rules were originally enacted and helps ensure
their validity.
More fundamentally, the determination of a rule’s validity
only reflects existing law at the time of that assessment. Assuming that the substantive effects of a rule could be exhausted
during the proposal process, the rule’s validity would be limited
159
to a static composition of the legal landscape. It is difficult to
explain how a federal rule’s substantive effects remain frozen
while the landscape against which those effects were originally
measured is fluid. In the pleading context, for example, not only has the Supreme Court introduced a new way of thinking
160
about pleading, but states are re-assessing their own standards, which may lead to substantive modifications. Thus, the
only way to ensure that the application of the plausibility
standard in federal courts does not have substantive effects is
to measure the rule’s continuing validity against emerging legal contexts.
C. LIMITING EGREGIOUS FORUM-SHOPPING
One major advantage to applying state pleading rules in
certain diversity cases is that it resolves a major issue in the
context of the federal court’s removal jurisdiction. When a
plaintiff files an action in state court, but a federal court would
have also been an appropriate forum, a defendant may remove
161
the action to the federal court without the consent of either
158. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (”Neither
‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables upon the particular problem for which it is used.”).
159. See Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and as-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1181, 1209 (2011) (observing that changes in the legal context may result in “a given procedural practice acquir[ing] a substantive rights valence
that it previously lacked”).
160. Compare Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (observing that notice pleading “relies on liberal discovery rules and summary
judgment to . . . to dispose of unmeritorious claims”), with Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (stating that “[i]t is no answer to say that a
claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can . . . be weeded out early
in the discovery process”).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and
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162

the state court or the plaintiff. Removal has significant procedural effect because once in federal court, the Federal Rules
displace the applicable state rules which previously controlled
163
the course of the litigation. Once an action is removed, the
federal court may even unwind orders that the state court
handed down prior to removal on the basis that there is a substantial difference between the applicable state and federal
164
procedural standards.
The federal court’s removal jurisdiction, therefore, allows a
diverse defendant to avoid a more lenient state pleading stand165
ard and avail himself of the federal plausibility standard. Exacerbating this power to avoid state pleading standards is the
district court’s aforementioned power to unwind state court or166
ders. Assuming a defendant complies with all the applicable
timing and filing requirements, this allows diverse defendants
to take a “wait-and-see” approach to forum selection based on
the outcome of a motion to dismiss. A defendant may file the
motion in state court, promptly remove the action if the motion
is denied, and subsequently refile the same motion in federal
court under the more strict plausibility standard. Courts have
upheld this approach to forum selection in the summary judgVenue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (“[A]ny civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”).
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758
(stating that removal is effected and that the “State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded” once the defendant gives notice of
the removal to the state court and all adverse parties).
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(1) (“These rules apply to a civil action after it is
removed from a state court.”).
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (2006) (“All injunctions orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and
effect until dissolved or modified by the district court.” (emphasis added)); see
also 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3738 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that “[o]rders or rulings issued
by the state court prior to removal are not conclusive in the federal action after removal” and that “[a] federal court has particularly good reason to reconsider a state court determination where federal standards differ from state
law standards on an issue”).
165. See Maness v. Bos. Scientific, 751 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (E.D. Tenn.
2010) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and applying the federal plausibility standard instead of Tennessee’s notice
pleading standard).
166. See supra note 164.
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167

ment context and there is no reason to think that the procedure would not be permitted with respect to pleading. This
wait-and-see approach is problematic because it undermines
the authority and finality of the state court’s judgment by permitting defendants to remove an action and refile their motion
to dismiss simply because they do not like the state court’s decision.
Applying less restrictive pleading standards in federal
courts would alleviate this problem without undermining the
purpose of removal jurisdiction. Defendants would still be able
to access the federal forum through removal jurisdiction, there168
by avoiding any local bias inherent to the state court. However, defendants would not be able to evade the state court’s
pleading standard—or any previous state court pleading judgments—by doing so.
CONCLUSION
The Erie doctrine and pleading standards are notoriously
murky areas of civil procedure. Attorneys who have attempted
to wade through these waters have harmed their clients’ inter169
ests by failing to grasp how these doctrines interact. In re167. See Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the defendant’s post-removal motion for summary judgment because the
federal and state standards were sufficiently different).
168. One of the major purposes of removal jurisdiction is to ensure that defendants are not subject to a state court which may be hostile to a diverse party’s interests. See generally 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2011) (“Like the diversity
of citizenship and alienage jurisdiction of the federal courts, the original right
to remove probably was designed to protect nonresidents from the local prejudices of state courts.”).
169. Inexplicably, attorneys who have attempted to challenge the plausibility standard under the Erie doctrine have severely misapplied the law. In two
recent appellate briefs, attorneys have cited the near-dead “outcome determinative” test to argue that Erie instructs federal courts to apply a state pleading standard. See Brief for Appellant at *19–25, Christiansen v. W. Branch
Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 11-1904, 2011 WL 2679065 (8th Cir. June 28, 2011) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) and arguing that “the
choice of pleading standard in Appellant’s case is outcome determinative”);
Brief for Appellants at *10–11, G&S Holdings LLC v. Cont. Cas. Co., No. 111813, 2011 WL 4542825 (7th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011) (arguing the same). The attorneys signing these briefs, however, succumbed to the very “fundamental
flaw” that the Supreme Court highlighted almost fifty years ago in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–70 (1965). Not only did the Hanna court abrogate
Erie’s old “outcome determinative test,” id. at 466–67 (“‘Outcomedetermination’ analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman.”), it also
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sponse, federal courts have dismissed Erie challenges to the
170
plausibility standard without due consideration. In order to
give plaintiffs’ complaints the best chance at surviving a motion
to dismiss, attorneys must do a better job at understanding the
law and thereby giving hurried courts reason to pause.
Fortunately, recent developments in state court pleading
standards and the Supreme Court’s Erie doctrine jurisprudence
provide an avenue for successfully challenging the plausibility
standard. Although pleading standards are quintessential procedural rules, they nevertheless serve to define the scope of certain substantive rights. Because the plausibility standard has
the collateral effect of narrowing the reach of such rights, it violates the REA’s limiting clause and, therefore, is not authorized
to displace more lenient state pleading standards.

held that Erie—whose progeny included the outcome determinative test—did
not direct the Court’s analysis where there was a controlling federal rule of
procedure, id. at 466–67, 473 (“[I]t cannot be forgotten that the Erie rule, and
the guidelines suggested in York, were created to serve another purpose altogether.”). Instead, where there is a controlling rule of federal procedure, courts
simply ask whether that rule is a valid exercise of the power to promulgate
procedural rules under the REA.
170. See Christiansen v. W. Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927, 938–39
(8th Cir. 2012) (stating without analysis that complaints in cases removed to
federal court are “governed by the current federal pleading standard”).

